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ARGUMENT 
L THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES BASED ON 
A PUNITIVE LIQUIDATED DAMAGES PROVISION. 
Utah "has long had a policy against the imposition of liquidated damages that 
constitute a penalty for breach of a contractual agreement." Woodhaven Apts. v. 
Washington, 942 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 1997). The goal of contract damages is 
compensation, not punishment of any perceived wrong. See Cook Assocs., Inc. v. 
Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161, 1167 (Utah 1983) ("It is settled as a general rule . . . that a 
plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages for a breach of contract") 
Notwithstanding CRE's arguments, the liquidated damages award in this case is 
punitive in nature and represents an extraordinary financial windfall for CRE. Such a 
windfall is wholly contrary to the purpose of contract damages. See, e.g., Western Oil & 
Fuel Co. vj£em£, 245 F.2d 633, 644 (8th Cir. 1957) ("A party recovering damages for 
breach of contract should not be better off because of the breach than he would have been 
had there been no breach."). The award has no reasonable relationship to CRE's actual 
damages and is grossly excessive on its face. Moreover, the District Court's entry of 
summary judgment was error because there was a dispute between the parties as to the 
existence and amount of CRE's actual damages. In addition, the District Court failed to 
properly apply Section 339 of the Restatement (First) of Contracts ("Section 339"). 
Therefore, the judgment should be reversed. 
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A. The Liquidated Damages Award Lacks Any Reasonable Relationship 
to CRE's Actual Damages. 
Utah does not enforce liquidated damages provisions when enforcement would 
result in an award "bearing no reasonable relationship to the actual damages suffered." 
Perkins v. Spencer, 243 P.2d 446, 449-50 (Utah 1952). As this Court stated in Madsen v. 
Anderson, 667 P.2d 44 (Utah 1983), it is the general rule that: 
[P]arties to a contract may agree to liquidated damages in the case of 
breach, and such agreements are enforceable if the amount of the 
liquidated damages agreed to is not disproportionate to the damages 
actually sustained. 
Id. at 47 (emphasis added). However, when "the amount of liquidated damages bears no 
reasonable relationship to the actual damage or is so grossly excessive as to be entirely 
disproportionate to any possible loss that might have been contemplated that it shocks the 
conscience the stipulation will not be enforced." Warner v. Rasmussen, 704 P.2d 559, 
561 (Utah 1985). 
Notwithstanding the fact that Comcast continued to pay rent, and CRE has 
received the full financial compensation due under the lease, even during those periods 
when the premises were unoccupied, the District Court awarded CRE liquidated damages 
based solely on Comcast's failure to continuously operate the property. The $3,760,553 
judgment includes an award of double-rent totaling $1,739,613, prejudgment interest in 
the amount of $2,008,541, late fees of $8,400, and attorney's fees in the fixed amount of 
$4,000. (R. 743-44.) Excluding interest, CRE obtained a judgment that is, at minimum, 
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255% of its own estimate of actual damages.1 The judgment is even more shocking in 
light of evidence introduced by Comcast that CRE suffered no actual damages, and that 
CRE's actual damages, in any event, could not have exceeded $120,000. (R. 492-574.) 
Assuming actual damages of $120,000, the judgment is approximately 1,450 % of any 
actual damages CRE sustained. CRE paid $1,850,000 to construct the building on the 
Property and stands to obtain a windfall that, with interest, amounts to more than double 
its construction costs. (R. 705.) It is undisputed that Comcast and TCI paid all base rent 
due on a timely basis and that CRE will receive a total of $5,510,000 in base rent over the 
term of the Lease. (R. 719.) Based on the double-rent CRE stands to obtain based on the 
liquidated damages provision in this case, the total rents CRE will receive is $7,249,613.3 
CRE presented evidence below that its damages amounted to $680,000, which 
represents just over one-third of the liquidated damages ultimately awarded in this case. 
(R. 170-74, 203.) Comcast disputed this estimate of damages, but contends that the 
liquidated damages award at issue here is grossly excessive even if CRE's estimate is 
accepted. 
CRE attempts to minimize the evidence of the disproportionality of the 
liquidated damages in this case by arguing that Comcast's evidence of its actual damages 
was uncertain in that it provided both a likely damages estimate of zero and a worst-cast 
estimate of $120,000. (Appellee's Brief, 20.) This argument, however, ignores the fact 
that, even if CRE's own estimate were accepted as fact, the actual damages in this case 
would still bear no relationship to the liquidated damages award. 
3
 While the requirement to pay double rent for failure to operate a leasehold may 
make sense in the context of a large shopping center lease where an anchor tenant's 
decision to vacate space has a tangible effect on the viability of the shopping center, no 
such circumstance exists here. This Lease was for office space in a single office 
building. There was no larger impact on the economic viability of the office building or 
the ability to lease office space by virtue of the vacancy. Additionally, Comcast 
continued to pay rent which ensured no significant economic harm to CRE as a result of 
the vacancy. 
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Taking into consideration both the rent paid and the damage award in this case, with 
interest, CRE stands to obtain a $9.3 million return on its investment of less than $2 
million. In short, CRE stands to obtain a windfall that far exceeds the expected benefit of 
its bargain and is grossly disproportionate to any damages that CRE can claim to have 
incurred. These damages are shockingly exorbitant, and the judgment should be 
reversed. 
CRE argues, erroneously, that under Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623 (Utah 1982), 
"even if the liquidated damages are in a range which is between 15 times the amount of 
the actual damages to 10% of the actual damages, the courts can still enforce the 
liquidated damages provision."4 (Appellee's Brief, 28.) Robbins did not hold that a 
liquidated damages awards of up to fifteen times the amount of actual damages can or 
should be sustained. Robbins dealt with the narrow issue of a $5,000 liquidated damages 
judgment against a hearing aid salesman for misappropriation of sales leads. Robbins, 
645 P.2d at 627. This Court noted the record lack evidence of any actual profits, but 
observed that, taking into account commissions due the defendant, the potential profit per 
sale would amount to $335 for a single hearing aid and $720 for a double. Id. Thus, the 
potential range of actual damages was between $6,700 for twenty sales of single hearing 
aids, to over $50,000 if for 154 sales. Id. 
4
 In so arguing, CRE ignores its own citation to Reliance, 858 P.2d at 1368 for 
the basic rule that "no precise mathematical formula exists for determining when 
liquidated damages are reasonably proportionate to the contract price." (Appellee's 
Brief, 27.) 
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At no point did Robbins, as CRE suggests, hold that the range of potential actual 
damages was between $335 and $5,000. Rather, Robbins reasoned that the possible 
damages, even if as few as twenty sales were made using misappropriated leads, were 
reasonable in proportion with a $5,000 liquidated damages award. Id. The dollar amount 
at issue in this case far exceeds the award in Robbins, even adjusted for inflation, and 
CRE cannot dispute that there is a gross disparity between any actual damages it may 
have sustained and its liquidated damages award. The District Court acknowledged this 
disparity, but failed to acknowledge the lack of any reasonable relationship between the 
liquidated damages and actual damages. (R. 653, 722.) 
It bears emphasis that the liquidated damages award in this case far exceeds 
awards that Utah courts have routinely rejected. For example, this Court has rejected a 
liquidated damages award amounting to approximately 351% of actual damages as 
excessive. See Soffe v. Ridd, 659 P.2d 1082, 1084 (Utah 1983) ("Liquidated damages of 
$20,725 do not bear a reasonable relationship to $5,895 actual damages.") Similarly, in 
Johnson v. Carman, 572 P.2d 371 (Utah 1977) this Court rejected a liquidated damages 
award that would allow a seller of real estate "to retain payments totaling some 34% 
greater than the actual damages determined by the trial court" as excessive. Id. at 373; 
see also Allen v. Kingdom 723 P.2d 394, 397 (Utah 1986) (rejecting liquidated damages 
award of $10,800, which represented 288% of actual loss amounting to $3,746). 
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B. The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment When 
There Was a Dispute as to the Material Fact of CRE's Actual 
Damages. 
Under Utah law, the existence and amount of actual damages is a key issue that a 
court must consider in determining the validity of a liquidated damages provision. E.g., 
Perkins, 243 P.2d at 449-50 (liquidated damages provision invalid if resulting award 
bears no relationship to actual damages); Woodhaven, 942 P.2d at 922 (holding that in 
the absence of evidence as to actual damages, it would be improper to sustain a liquidated 
damages award). Here, the District Court directly acknowledged that there was an issue 
of fact as to whether CRE had sustained any damages at all, and that there was a gross 
disparity between CRE's $680,000 estimate of its actual damages and liquidated 
damages. (R. 653, 708, 722.) The District Court then erroneously entered summary 
judgment in CRE's favor. 
In Wilson v. Johnson, 2010 UT App. 137, the Utah Court of Appeals addressed a 
case involving a claimed breach of a real estate purchase contract. Id. at ^ 1-4. Both 
parties moved for summary judgment, and the trial court entered summary judgment in 
favor of the plaintiffs, awarding them $40,000 in liquidated damages. Id. at f^ 5. The 
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that summary judgment was improper because there 
was a factual dispute as to the payment terms and the parties' intent. Id. at f^ 26. 
Similarly, in this case, there is a dispute between the parties as to whether CRE suffered 
any damages and a question as to what types of damage, if any, the liquidated damages 
provision was intended to remedy. 
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CRE mistakenly relies on Bair v. Axiom Design, 2001 UT 20, 20 P.3d 388, and 
Young Electric Sign Co. v. United Standard West, Inc., 755 P.2d 162 (Utah 1988), to 
support the proposition that the District Court's failure to consider evidence of actual 
damages was not in error. (Appellee's Brief at 25.) These cases do not, as CRE 
suggests, stand for the proposition that courts are free to ignore evidence relating to the 
amount of actual damages sustained in considering the validity of a liquidated damages 
award. Rather, they hold that an enforceable liquidated damages clause can "obviate the 
need for the non-breaching party to prove actual damages." Bair, 2001 UT 20, f^ 25, 20 
P.3d at 394; accord Young, 755 P.2d at 165 ("If a liquidated damages provision is 
enforceable, a plaintiff need not prove actual damages.") In other words, if the elements 
of Section 339 can be satisfied without reference to actual damages, it would be 
appropriate to uphold a liquidated damages award. Young, 755 P.2d at 165. 
Bair addressed a situation in which a photographic transparency leasing company 
sought liquidated damages against a defendant for failure to return transparencies. Bair, 
2001 UT 20, fflfl- 25, 20 P.3d at 389-94. Nothing in Bair indicates that the defendant, 
who opposed enforcement of the liquidated damages provision, presented any evidence 
as to the amount of the actual damages the plaintiff sustained. Bair was reversed and 
remanded for new trial in part because the trial court had improperly placed the burden of 
proving that the liquidated damages provision represented a reasonable forecast of actual 
damages on the plaintiff. Id. at % 26. Thus, Bair does not support CRE's argument that 
the District Court properly ignored the evidence presented concerning actual damages. 
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Similarly, Young addressed the validity of liquidated damages provision in a lease 
for a custom-made sign. In that case, the defendant made no effort to "assert or prove 
that liquidated damages were unreasonably disproportionate to compensatory damages." 
Young, 755 P.2d at 165. Young actually considered the amount of the plaintiffs possible 
actual damages and concluded that if actual damages were awarded, they would have 
exceeded the liquidated damages award by only twenty-five percent. Id. 
This is not case in which the elements of Section 339 could be met without 
considering the issue of actual damages. While the District Court acknowledged that 
"[t]he true gravaman [sic] of this analysis must be whether the parties were attempting in 
good faith to arrive at a fair way to determine what actual damages might be," the Court 
also observed that it had been presented with no evidence as to why a liquidated damages 
provision was included in the Lease, or what damages it was intended to address. (R. 
653-55.) Comcast disagrees that it was required to present evidence of the parties' 
negotiations to satisfy this requirement. Indeed, Comcast argued that the provision was 
unenforceable based both on the Lease itself and on evidence of actual damages. CRE, 
apart from presenting its own estimate of actual damages (which is still grossly 
disproportionate to the liquidated damages award), points to no evidence in the record 
that supports the District Court's conclusion that the liquidated damages provision 
represented a good faith effort "to arrive at a fair way to determine what actual damages 
might be." (R. 654.) Put simply, the District Court erred in ruling that Comcast failed to 
meet its burden of establishing the invalidity of the liquidated damages provision and, 
therefore, in denying Comcast's summary judgment motion. Moreover, because CRE 
DMWEST #7770297 v2 8 
failed to submit any evidence to controvert what the District Court considered to be the 
"gravamen" of its ruling, the District Court erred in granting CRE's summary judgment 
motion. Finally, assuming there is any remaining material question of fact on this issue, 
the case should be remanded for further proceedings, including discovery and, if 
necessary, trial. 
C. The District Court Failed to Properly Apply Section 339 in 
Considering the Enforceability of the Liquidated Damages Provision. 
1. Comcast Met Its Burden of Demonstrating that the Liquidated 
Damages Award Did Not Constitute a Reasonable Forecast of Just 
Compensation. 
Comcast met its burden of establishing that the liquidated damages award did not 
constitute a reasonable forecast of just compensation for any harm that CRE could have 
sustained.5 Evidence as to the amount of actual damages is admissible to establish that a 
liquidated damages award does not constitute a reasonable forecast of just compensation. 
While Utah cases have stated that the party opposing enforcement of a 
liquidated damages provision bears the burden of establishing its validity, Section 339 
states that liquidated damages provisions are presumptively invalid. Section 339 states in 
pertinent part: 
(1) [A]n agreement, made in advance of breach fixing damages 
therefore, is not enforceable as a contract and does not affect the 
damages recoverable for the breach, unless 
(a) the amount so fixed is a reasonable forecast of just 
compensation for the harm that is caused by the breach, and 
(b) the harm that is caused by the breach is one that is 
incapable or very difficult of accurate estimation. 
Restatement (First) of Contracts, § 339. Further, Utah courts have traditionally viewed 
liquidated damages provisions "with some degree of suspicion because they may not 
reasonably approximate compensatory damages." Robbins, 645 P.2d at 625. 
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Reliance Ins. Co. v. Utah Dept. of Transp., 858 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Utah 1993) ("If, on the 
other hand, the liquidated damages are disproportionate to the actual compensatory 
damages sustained, this may be evidence of an unreasonable forecast and the provision 
may be deemed a penalty and not enforced."). The liquidated damages awarded in this 
case are grossly disproportionate even to CRE's estimate of actual damages, and does not 
represent a reasonable forecast of just compensation. 
CRE contends that the District Court's ruling should be upheld because "Comcast 
presented no evidence to the trial court from anyone who participated in the discussions 
between the parties which led to the lease or the liquidated damages provision." 
(Appellee's Brief, 14.) In other words, CRE's position is that the only way to determine 
the invalidity of the liquidated damages provision would be to delve into communications 
between TCI and CRE that took place more than fifteen years ago at the time the Lease 
was executed. Of course, this is directly contrary to the Utah cases which uniformly hold 
that evidence of actual damages sustained can serve to demonstrate that a liquidated 
damages provision was an unreasonable forecast. Moreover, if the absence of such 
testimony was determinative, the District Court should have denied both parties' motions 
and permitted them to conclude discovery. 
CRE also ignores well-established law with respect to contract interpretation under 
which the intentions of the parties are best determined not from extraneous evidence, but 
from the contract itself. See Peterson & Simpson v. IHC Health Servs., Inc., 2009 UT 
54, *| 13, 217 P.3d 716 ("As with any contract, we determine what the parties have agreed 
upon by looking first to the plain language within the four corners of the document."); 
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Perkins, 243 P.2d at 451 (interpretation of a liquidated damages provision "depends upon 
an interpretation of the whole instrument in the light of all of the circumstances 
surrounding the transaction"). The Lease itself is evidence that the liquidated damages 
provision does not represent a reasonable forecast of just compensation for any harm to 
CRE. There is no great mystery as to the types of damages that arise from the breach of a 
lease: loss of rental income, costs related to re-letting the property, and, possibly, 
diminution in value. Comcast presented evidence that CRE suffered no such losses.6 
While CRE claims that it had anticipated that TCI would serve as an "anchor tenant" 
driving nearby development, the District Court found that no such intentions were 
manifest in the Lease and that CRE never made TCI or Comcast aware of its alleged 
intentions. (R. 710). Nothing in the Lease indicates any basis upon which to justify the 
absurd result that the rental value of the Property while vacaitt is triple that of the 
Property with a tenant present. 
2. The Alleged Harm Caused by TCFs Failure to Occupy the Property 
Was Not Difficult to Estimate. 
The District Court opined that because the Lease did not specify the types of 
damages to be remedied by the liquidated damages provision, it "had difficulty 
determining whether it was possible for the parties to reach an accurate estimate of 
damages which were hypothetical at the time the contract wais formed." (R. 724.) This 
constitutes reversible error in two respects. 
6
 Nor did CRE attempt to sell the Property, which would be a necessary part of 
establishing any claim for diminution in value based on the failure of TCI and Comcast to 
continually operate from the premises. 
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First, Comcast had met its burden of establishing that the damages at issue in this 
case could be accurately estimated. As set forth above, the types of damages that the 
parties should have anticipated are readily apparent from the Lease itself. Utah courts 
have repeatedly looked to the language of the contract and transaction at issue to 
determine whether liquidated damages could reasonably be estimated. See Perkins, 243 
P.2d at 450-51 (examining type of contract and determining that the damages were of a 
type that could be easily determined); Woodhaven, 942 P.2d at 922-23 (examining type 
of contract and possible damages). 
In Prudential Capital Group Co. v. Mattson, 802 P.2d 104 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), 
the Utah Court of Appeals addressed a case in which a plaintiff sought future lease 
payments from the defendant based on a liquidated damages provision in an aircraft 
lease. Id- at 105-07. Recognizing that it could not "compare actual damages against 
stipulated liquidated damages where the court made no findings as to actual damages," 
the court instead looked to the language of the lease itself to determine the possible actual 
damages, concluding that the full value of rent would have been $1,279,589, while the 
liquidated damages award amounted only to $246,462. Id. at 107. 
The contract in this case is a commercial lease. The District Court, following the 
example of Perkins, Woodhaven, and Mattson, could have easily drawn conclusions as to 
the types of damages that are available for a breach of a commercial lease. Indeed, 
Comcast argued below that lost rents and cost of reletting were the principal damages that 
could be anticipated in the event of a breach. (R. 485-89.) 
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CRE argues that the liquidated damages represent a reasonable forecast because 
"it is clear that the parties reasonably anticipated that CRE would suffer damages if TCI 
or Comcast abandoned the building prior to the expiration of4the lease term." (Appellee's 
Brief, 21.) In other words, CRE claims the disputed liquidated damages must constitute a 
reasonable forecast of damages because the Lease provides a means for their calculation. 
If that was the limit of the required analysis, no liquidated damage provision could ever 
be found to be unenforceable. 
CRE then speculates that "an empty building is more likely to need expensive 
repairs." (Id-) But the liquidated damages at issue in this case could not be intended to 
remedy damages occurring to an empty building because, as CRE admits, under the 
Lease, the tenant is responsible for any needed repairs to the premises. (Appellee's Brief, 
21; R. 316, 331.) Nor could potential litigation costs represent an element of the 
liquidated damages, as the Lease includes an attorneys' fee provision. (R. 481-90.) 
Similarly, CRE's argument that a vacant building would be harder to sell at the end of the 
lease period, like its argument that TCI would have served as an anchor tenant, is rank 
speculation not supported by any evidence in the record. (Appellee's Brief, 21-22.) 
Second, the District Court erroneously held that the second prong of Section 339 
was met because the liquidated damages provision was not unconscionable. (R. 724-25.) 
In CRE's own words, "Section 339 does not require a consideration of whether the 
liquidated damages provision is unconscionable." (Appellee's Brief, 38.) The District 
Court, however, not only considered the issue of unconscionability, but the sole basis 
upon which the District Court held that Comcast failed to meet its burden under the 
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second prong of Section 339 was that the liquidated damages provision in this case was 
not unconscionable, i.e., because the lessee was a sophisticated corporation, the provision 
was enforceable notwithstanding proper application of the law. The District Court's 
reasoning is plainly error because unconscionability, as CRE concedes, plays no role in 
determining the enforceability of a liquidated damages provision. 
CRE does not argue that the law of unconscionability plays a role in determining 
whether damages are of a type that is difficult to estimate, or even defend the District 
Court's ruling that the lack of unconscionability satisfies the second prong of Section 
339. Instead, CRE argues that "Utah courts have routinely considered elements of 
unconscionability in their analysis of liquidated damages provisions." (Appellee's Brief, 
11.) In so arguing, CRE grossly overstates the role of the parties' relative sophistication 
in determining the enforceability of liquidated damages provisions. 
Reaching beyond the actual language of Utah's liquidated damages jurisprudence, 
CRE argues that Utah courts "have, consciously or not, applied different standards based 
on their perception of the parties." (Appellee's Brief, 29 (emphasis added).) Putting 
aside for the moment the question as to how CRE can discern, let alone cite, an 
"unconscious" application of law, this argument is wholly incorrect. Again, Utah has 
explicitly adopted Section 339, under which the relative sophistication of the parties 
plays no role. Reliance, 858 P.2d at 1366. Under Section 339, it makes no difference 
whether either or both of the parties were sophisticated business entities or whether the 
parties bargained for the liquidated damages provision. 
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Moreover, CRE's analysis of the case law is riddled with speculation. For 
example, in Robbins, a hearing aid company sought to enforce a liquidated damages 
provision requiring a former employee to pay $5,000 for having misappropriated his 
employer's sales leads. Robbins, 645 P.2d at 624-26. Robbins does observe, in dicta, 
that the record did not support a finding of unconscionability. Id. at 627. Before so 
observing, however, the Court had already determined that both elements of Section 339 
were met. Id. Robbins is thus best understood as having first considered Section 339, 
then, having determined that both elements of Section 339 w^re met, separately and 
independently considering whether the liquidated damages award would be 
unconscionable. In addition, Robbins addresses an employment relationship, in which 
relative bargaining strength could have been in issue, not a contractual relationship 
between two commercial entities. Id. at 624-27. In any event, Robbins does not stand for 
the proposition that Utah courts applying Section 339 should somehow take into account 
the relative sophistication of the parties. 
CRE's reliance on Park Valley Corp. v. Bagley, 635 P.2d 65 (Utah 1981) is 
similarly misplaced. Park Valley arose out of a forfeiture provision contained in a 
uniform real estate contract. Id. at 66-67. The parties in Park Valley were a commercial 
real estate enterprise and an individual purchaser of real estate. Id. At no point does Park 
Valley make any mention of the relative sophistication of the parties—in fact, while the 
district court in Park Valley reduced the amount of the forfeiture based on 
unconscionability, this Court reversed due to the lack of evidence in the record 
supporting those rulings. Id. at 68. Park Valley is better understood as an 
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unconscionability case than as a liquidated damages case—indeed, it did not even 
consider the enforceability of the forfeiture under Section 339. Instead, the trial court in 
Park Valley made a factual determination of damages and unconscionability and this 
Court reversed based on the lack of evidentiary support in the record. Either way, Park 
Valley does not support CRE's position that the relative sophistication of the parties 
plays a role in a Section 339 analysis. 
Finally, CRE argues that in Reliance, "both parties to the contract were 
sophisticated and neither party had an advantage in bargaining position." (Appellee's 
Brief, 30.) While Reliance characterized the parties as "professional participants 
experienced in contract formation," like Robbins, it only did so in dicta after having held 
that both elements of Section 339 had been met. Reliance, 858 P.2d at 1369-70. 
Reliance did not, as CRE suggests, hold that the relative sophistication of the parties was 
a necessary or even important factor for analysis of liquidated damages under Section 
339. In making these comments, Reliance did not expressly or impliedly state that its 
analysis would have been any different had the parties not been commercial entities. 
Having made its argument that Utah courts routinely uphold liquidated damages 
provisions where the parties are sophisticated, despite its own acknowledgement that 
such considerations play no role in an analysis under Section 339, CRE reasons that "the 
story is different, however, when the courts perceive that one or both of the parties is 
unsophisticated." (Appellee's Brief, 32.) To support this proposition, CRE turns to 
Woodhaven, which it claims represents an example of a case in which a Utah court 
perceived that at least one of the parties was unsophisticated. (Id.) Woodhaven, 
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however, does not expressly or impliedly make any reference to the relative 
sophistication of the parties. Id. at 922-23. CRE's claim that the contract at issue in 
Woodhaven was a contract of adhesion is rank speculation. (Appellee's Brief, 32.) 
Indeed, Woodhaven observed that no claim of procedural unconscionability was at issue. 
Id at 925. Woodhaven actually held that the liquidated damages provision in question 
was unenforceable under Section 339, but not unconscionable. Id. at 925. 
CRE's reliance on Perkins as an unconscionability decision is similarly flawed. 
CRE argues that Perkins "seemed concerned that neither party was aware of the 
liquidated damages provision and that no special attention was given to the liquidated 
damages provision." (Appellee's Brief, 35.) While Perkins observed that the parties 
failed to pay any attention to the liquidated damages provision, it did not make any 
specific observations as to the relative sophistication of the parties. Id. at 451. Perkins 
applied Section 339 independently of any analysis of the parties' perceived 
sophistication, determining that no actual damages had been incurred and that the 
damages were of a type that was easily calculable. Id. at 453-54. Accordingly, Perkins 
refused to enforce the forfeiture at issue. Id. 
Simply put, CRE's brief vastly overstates the importance of the sophistication of 
the parties in analyzing liquidated damages provisions. Section 339 itself and Utah case 
law has made it clear that factors relating to unconscionability, including the parties' 
relative sophistication, plays no role in consideration of a liquidated damages provision 
under Section 339. Thus, the District Court's reference to the relative sophistication of 
the parties in considering the second prong of Section 339 was error. 
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II. ADOPTION OF SECTION 356 OF THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS WOULD BRING CLARITY TO EXISTING UTAH LAW, 
Adopting Section 356 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981) ("Section 
356") would substantially clarify Utah law on liquidated damages.7 Section 356 was 
adopted for the express purpose of bringing the restatement into harmony with the 
standard for enforceability set forth in Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which 
o 
has been adopted in Utah and 48 of its sister states. Having been already adopted by 
statute, this standard is clearly supported by public policy. CRE offers no arguments to 
the contrary. 
Instead, CRE argues that Comcast failed to preserve the right to argue that Section 
356 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts should be applied. According to CRE, 
Comcast is limited to rehashing arguments in the summary judgment briefs presented to 
the trial court. Comcast, however, preserved the issue of whether the liquidated damages 
provision is enforceable as a matter of law, and cited to Section 356 as relevant legal 
authority for the proposition that the liquidated damages provision in this case is not 
Section 356 states: 
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated but only at an 
amount that is reasonable in light of the anticipated or actual loss 
caused by the breach and the difficulties of proof of loss. A term 
fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is unenforceable on 
the grounds of public policy as a penalty. 
8
 See, e ^ , Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-718 (1) ("Damages for breach by either 
party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an amount which is reasonable in the 
light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of 
loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. 
A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty.") 
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enforceable, quoting the provision in full in its opposition to CRE's motion for partial 
summary judgment. (R. 482.) 
The central issue presented by this appeal is the same issue that was presented to 
the trial court, namely whether the liquidated damages provision is enforceable. As 
Comcast pointed out in requesting this Court to retain the appeal, even the District Court 
observed the existing test presents "a Hobson's choice," with "the question of 
reasonableness becoming] somewhat circular and subjective: how can one meet a 
burden of proof to demonstrate anticipated damages are reasonable and yet difficult and 
impractical to prove at the same time." (R. 721 (internal quotation marks omitted).) 
Presenting additional arguments in support of a position that Comcast has taken from the 
outset—and suggesting that a confusing test be replaced with a workable test—is not 
prohibited by O'Dea v. Plea, 2009 UT 46,115, 217 P.3d 704, Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 
92 (Utah 1986), or Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co.. 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998). In O'Dea, this Court refused to hear constitutional, personal jurisdiction, full faith 
and credit, and choice of law challenges to the dismissal of a paternity claim raised for 
the first time on appeal. 2009 UT 46, fflj 16-24. In Katz, this Court refused to hear a 
challenge to the amount of default judgment raised for the first time on appeal. 732 P.2d 
at 95. And in Badger, the Utah Court of Appeals refused to review claims concerning 
private well rights that the plaintiffs had failed to raise in an administrative hearing before 
the State Engineer. 966 P.2d at 847. These cases are easily distinguishable from the 
present case because Comcast has argued from the outset that the liquidated damages 
provision in this case is unenforceable. 
DMWEST #7770297 v2 19 
Badger sets forth three specific factors which help determine whether an issue has 
been preserved: "(1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be 
specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal 
authority." Id- at 847. Section 356 is not technically an "issue" to be preserved; it is 
relevant legal authority, and, as urged on this appeal, should become controlling 
authority. Moreover, this Court has inherent authority to consider any issue on appeal, 
including issues not raised by the parties, if doing so is necessary for a proper decision. 
Kaiserman Associates, Inc. v. Francis Town, 977 P.2d 462, 464 (Utah 1998). Nearly 
thirty years ago, in Madsen v. Anderson, 667 P.2d 44, 47 (Utah 1983), this Court cited 
Section 356 favorably for the proposition that liquidated damages agreements "are 
enforceable if the amount of the liquidated damages agreed to is not disproportionate to 
the damages actually sustained." This statement itself has been a cornerstone in the law 
of liquidated damages in Utah. See Reliance, 858 P.2d 1363 (citing Madsen and Young 
for the proposition that liquidated damages "disproportionate to the actual compensatory 
damages sustained . . . may be evidence of an unreasonable forecast"). 
CRE also argues that this Court should not adopt Section 356 as the standard 
because "replacing § 339 with § 356 would create no change in the substance of the 
analysis or the law." (Appellee's Brief, 44.) The fact that adoption of Section 356 would 
not be a gross departure from existing law, however, is simply another basis for this 
Court to give serious consideration to its adoption. While Section 339 has been the law 
of this State since Perkins was decided in 1952, Utah courts have, in practice, repeatedly 
recognized that evidence of actual damages plays a role in determining the validity of a 
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liquidated damages provision. See Reliance, 858 P.2d at 1367 ("If. . . the liquidated 
damages are disproportionate to the actual compensatory damages sustained, this may be 
evidence of an unreasonable forecast"); Woodhaven, 942 P.2d at 922 ("To determine if 
the liquidated damages clause amount has a reasonable relationship to the fee, there must 
at least be some evidence of the costs anticipated when the lease was executed.") Section 
356 simply sets forth in a single, clear statement what Utah courts have been saying for 
decades—that a liquidated damages provision is enforceable if it is reasonable in light of 
the anticipated or actual loss, and that a provision that imposes an excessive award is 
unenforceable. Reliance, 858 P.2d at 1367; Woodhaven, 942 P.2d at 920-922; Mattson, 
802 P.2d at 106 ([Provisions for liquidated damages have been upheld the same as other 
terms in the contract, except where the amount of liquidated damages "bears no 
reasonable relationship to the actual damage.) Accordingly, Comcast urges this Court to 
adopt Section 356 and to reverse the award of liquidated damages in this case. 
III. ADOPTING UNCONSCIONABILITY AS A STANDARD WOULD 
VIOLATE UTAH LAW AND ESTABLISHED PUBLIC POLICY. 
CRE argues that instead of adopting Section 356, which it admits would not 
substantively change Utah law, Utah should apply a basic unconscionability standard to 
liquidated damages provisions. (Appellee's Brief, 37.) In so doing, CRE invites this 
Court to abandon more than fifty years of precedent and make Utah law an outlier in this 
subject area. 
CRE advocates adopting an unconscionability standard in order to remedy what it 
labels the "confusing and unsatisfactory" state of Utah law on liquidated damages. 
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(Appellee's Brief, 35.) As discussed above, however, while Utah cases on liquidated 
damages are, on their surface, somewhat confusing, the overarching principles are 
consistent and could be clearly stated by adopting Section 356. CRE's suggested 
prescription—adoption of unconscionability as the sole basis upon which a liquidated 
damages provision could be avoided—would be a catastrophe, not a remedy. 
States have adopted specific standards for the enforcement of liquidated damages 
as a part of their recognition that the damages allowed for a breach of contract are strictly 
compensatory in nature. E.g. Robbins, 645 P.2d at 625. As a matter of policy, punitive 
damages cannot be awarded for a breach of contract. Cook Assocs., Inc. v. Warnick, 664 
P.2d 1161, 1167 (Utah 1983). The "strong policy reasons underlying this rule include" 
the fact that "such awards discourage efficient breach, which our judicial system 
encourages." Bell v. Bd. of Educ. 625 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1219 (D.N.M. 2008). 
"Breaches of contract that are in fact efficient and wealth-enhancing should be 
encouraged." Thyssen, Inc. v. S.S. Fortune Star, 777 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir.1985). As the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held, 
Even if [a breach of contract] is deliberate, it is not necessarily 
blameworthy. The promisor may simply have discovered that his 
performance is worth more to someone else. If so, efficiency is 
promoted by allowing him to break his promise, provided he makes 
good the promisee }s actual losses. If he is forced to pay more than 
that, an efficient breach may be deterred, and the law doesn't want 
to bring about such a result. 
Patton v. Mid-Continent Systems, Inc., 841 P.2d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.) 
(emphasis added). 
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Adopting unconscionability as the sole basis upon which a liquidated damages 
provision could be negated would discourage efficient breach. Indeed, in the absence of 
standards for negating a liquidated damages provision outside of unconscionability, 
parties could effectively stipulate to permit punitive damages in the event of breach, 
thereby narrowing the distinction between contract and tort lkw and adopting a rule that 
would permit parties to profit from breach, rather than simply recovering compensatory 
damages. Comcast is not suggesting that the Court take a paternalistic approach and 
allow parties to lightly avoid their contractual obligations. Indeed, Comcast made every 
effort to ensure that CRE was permitted to enjoy the benefit of its bargain, having paid 
rent continuously since the execution of the Lease. It makes no sense, however, to 
enforce a liquidated damages provision that would force Conjicast to either make use of a 
facility for which it has no use or pay more than triple the rent. 
Contrary to CRE's argument, there is no basis upon which the Court could 
"assume that Comcast believed the provision was reasonable when it drafted the 
provision." (Appellee's Brief, 16.) Despite CRE's characterization of Comcast as the 
drafter, the record is clear that the TCI's agent drafted the Lease using boilerplate 
language. (R. 212-234, 718.) Nor may the Court assume, as CRE suggests, that 
"Comcast included the liquidated damages provision with the understanding that, if it 
ever breached the lease, it could claim the provision was unenforceable and escape its 
operation." (Appellee's Brief, 16.) It is the law and the record below that will determine 
this appeal, not CRE's assumptions. The types of damages that were available in the 
event of a breach of this Lease are readily apparent from the Lease itself. Allowing 
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punitive damages to be imposed for a breach of contract is wholly contrary to Utah law 
and public policy. Accordingly, the District Court's judgment should be reversed.9 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER CRE'S 
UNDISPUTED FAILURE TO MITIGATE ITS DAMAGES. 
CRE does not dispute that it owed a general duty to mitigate its damages, but 
claims that under the circumstances of this case "there was nothing more CRE could have 
done to mitigate its damages." (Appellee's Brief, 45.) CRE, however, acknowledges that 
it could have hired its own agent to seek a new tenant and failed to do so. (Appellee's 
Brief, 47.) Again, it is undisputed that CRE's only effort to mitigate was to refer 
inquiries to Comcast's agent. CRE clearly could have done more to locate a new tenant, 
and could have further mitigated its damages had it made efforts to sell or lease the 
premises. It is telling that CRE speculates that Comcast's failure to continuously occupy 
the premises negatively impacted the value of its property, given the total absence of 
evidence in the record to indicate that CRE made any attempt to sell the building. The 
record plainly indicates that CRE did nothing more than sit on its hands and allow 
liquidated damages to accrue. 
In addition, CRE does not defend the District Court's failure to assess the impact 
of CRE's failure to mitigate, nor could it. The District Court's ruling is based on the 
erroneous legal conclusion that "the contract specified that the building was to be 
occupied by TCI, not just any commercial tenant." (R. 655.) Because of this, the District 
9
 If the Court were to abandon fifty-plus years of Utah law on liquidated 
damages and adopt unconscionability as the standard, it should do so only prospectively, 
and the judgment awarded in this case should still be reversed. 
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Court concluded that "[wjhere the contract specified particularly that TCI was to occupy 
the building, the Court will not speculate as to what CRE could or should have done to 
secure another tenant." (Id-) This reasoning is pure error. CRE has acknowledged 
throughout this litigation that the presence of a subtenant constitutes operation of the 
Property for the purposes of the Lease. (R. 719-20; Appellee's Brief 7-8, 46-47.) 
Accordingly, the judgment should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and those stated in Comcast's principal brief, Comcast 
respectfully requests this Court to reverse the District Court's judgment, declare the 
liquidated damages provision at issue in this case unenforceable as a matter of law, and 
remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 23rd day of August 2010. 
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DMWEST #7770297 v2 25 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF 
OF APPELLANT COMCAST OF UTAH II, INC were served on the following this 
23rd day of August 2010, in the manner set forth below: 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Federal Express 
[ ] Certified Mail, Receipt No. , return receipt requested 
Richard W. Jones 
Keith M. Backman 
HELGESEN, WATERFALL & JONES 
Centennial Bank Building 
4605 Harrison Boulevard, 3rd Floor 
Ogden,UT 84403 
DMWEST #7770297 v2 26 
